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PEER EFFECTS IN CHARITABLE GIVING: EVIDENCE FROM
THE (RUNNING) FIELD*
Sarah Smith, Frank Windmeijer and Edmund Wright
There is a widespread belief that peer effects are important in charitable giving but little evidence on
how donors respond to their peers. Analysing a unique data set of donations to online fund-raising
pages, we find positive and sizeable peer effects: a £10 increase in the mean of past donations
increases giving by £2.50, on average. Donations respond to both very large and very small amounts
and to changes in the mode. We find little evidence that donations signal charity quality – our
preferred explanation is that donors use information on earlier donations to decide what is
appropriate for them to give.
The size of your gift can persuade your peer to make a contribution as
significant as yours.
‘How to succeed in fundraising by really trying’ by Lewis B. Cullman.
This study is concernedwithpeer effects in charitable giving– specifically theway inwhich
the amount that donors give responds to donations made by others in their peer group.
There is a widespread belief that such peer effects are important but there is surprisingly
little direct evidence. Early studies used cross-section data to define generic reference
groups in terms of income (Feldstein andClotfelter, 1976) and other socio-demographic
characteristics such as age and education (Andreoni and Scholz, 1998). More recent
experimental studies have looked at the effect of ‘social cues’ – i.e. single pieces of
information about how much has been given by other people, unknown to the donor,
such as a previous cohort or a typical donor (Frey and Meier, 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008;
Shang andCroson, 2009).Thereare two studies that have lookeddirectly at peer effects in
giving.Meer (2011) focusedonpeer effects in solicitation, looking atwhether people give
more if the ask comes from someone they know. Carman (2004) studied peer effects
among workplace teams but, in this case, the peer group included the team captain who
playeda role inencouragingandmotivatinggivingamong teammembers.Ours is thefirst
study we are aware of to look at purely horizontal (donor-to-donor) peer effects in giving.
We empirically investigate how donors are influenced by the donations of their peers
in the context of individual online fund-raising. In the UK, this is a major source of
income for many charities. Since 2001, more than two million individual fund-raisers
*Corresponding author: Sarah Smith, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Road,
Bristol BS8 1TN, UK. Email: sarah.smith@bristol.ac.uk
This research was funded by the Leverhulme Foundation (Grant F/00 182/A2) and the Economic and
Social Research Council (Grant RES-343-28-0001). Thanks to Justgiving for providing us with their data
and to two anonymous referees, Rachel Griffith, Clare Leaver, Abigail Payne and Kimberley Scharf and
participants at seminars in Essex, Mannheim, Rotterdam, Southampton, Stirling, the workshop on the social
dimension of organisations at the CUI in Budapest and the CEPR conference on charitable giving and
altruism, Paris, for helpful comments and discussions. Any views – and in particular any errors – are our own.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
[ 1053 ]
The Economic Journal, 125 (June), 1053–1071. Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12114© 2013 TheAuthor(s). The Economic Journal Published by JohnWiley& Sons Ltd on behalf
of the Royal Economic Society. Published by JohnWiley & Sons, 9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX4 2DQ,UK and350Main Street,Malden,MA02148, USA.
have raised more than £1 billion for a wide range of different charities through the
biggest individual online fund-raising website, and this has been growing over time.1 The
way that individual online fund-raising typically works is as follows: Individual fund-
raisers decide on a fund-raising activity to raise money for their chosen charity (these
activities often involve a sporting event such as running a marathon or swimming the
English Channel but novelty activities such as head shaving are also popular). The fund-
raisers then set-up personalised web pages on a fund-raising website and invite people to
make donations to their chosen charities. Most of the donations come from the fund-
raiser’s friends, family and colleagues.2 Almost all are made online via the fund-raising
page and are passed directly by the fund-raising website to the charity. The online
donations are listed on the fund-raising page, with themost recent first.3 Information on
how much has been given and by whom,4 is then visible to each donor who arrives at the
fund-raising page. When donors go to the page to make a donation they can see all the
previous online donations that have beenmade; we exploit this set-up to look at whether
donors are influenced by how much other people have given.
Of course, donations made to the same page will be correlated because of the
common characteristics of the peer group – the fund-raiser’s friends, family and work
colleagues. Our identification strategy relies on the within-page variation in the
observed history of donations that arises as a result of donors arriving at the website at
different times.5 In essence, we argue that there is plausibly exogenous variation in the
set of donations observed by each donor because exactly when donors make their
donation is subject to random factors, such as when they turn on their computer and
find time to log on to the fund-raising website to make a donation. We further discuss
our identification strategy in Sections 3 and 4.
We provide direct evidence on the direction andmagnitude of peer effects in giving. In
principle, it is possible that other people’s donations could ‘crowd out’ giving (Warr, 1982;
Roberts, 1984) but we show that higher (average) donations cause people to increase the
amount that they give – a £10 increase in themean of past donations causes people to give
£2.50moreonaverage.Onepotential criticismof a simple ‘linear-in-means’ specification is
thatitcanmaskthepotentiallydiversewaysinwhichpeereffectscanwork(Sacerdote,2011).
1 For comparison, total donations from individuals in the UK were estimated to be £13 billion in 2010–11.
2 We do not have direct information on the identity of the donors or their relationship with the fund-
raiser. However, we have supporting evidence that they are mainly friends, family and colleagues from a
separate survey of approximately 19,000 Justgiving donors (Payne et al., 2011). Of those who had been asked
to give to a fund-raising page, 84% had been asked by a family member (of whom 87% said that they always
gave when asked); 96% had been asked by a friend (67% always gave); 89% had been asked by a colleague
(48% always gave); 70% had been asked by a charity representative (only 9% always gave).
3 Donors can see up to 30 or 50 past donations by scrolling down without having to click through. As the
median number of donations is 33, this means that most donors can see all previous donations in one go.
4 Donors can choose to donate anonymously. Unfortunately, whether or not a donation was given
anonymously was miscoded for more than half our sample, which means that we cannot do a full analysis on
the effects of anonymity. Where we do have information, we find that 11% of donations are made
anonymously. Large and small donations are more likely to be made anonymously as might be expected. We
find that the effect of large and small donations is not affected by whether or not the donation was made
anonymously. We also find that the probability of giving anonymously does not change after a large or small
donation.
5 Mas and Moretti (2009) provide perhaps the closest study to our study in terms of identification. They
look at the effect of peers’ productivity in the context of supermarket checkouts, exploiting randomness
arising from the scheduling of checkout operatives. They estimate individual-specific fixed effects; we do not
have sufficient observations to allow us to do this.
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We are able to shed light on the nature of peer effects in giving and show that the amount
givenisaffectedbothby‘shiningknights’(very largedonations)andby‘widows’mites’(very
small donations), as well as there being ‘herd behaviour’ (donations following themode).
We also exploit the richness of our data to explore some of the underlying
mechanisms that might explain why donors respond positively to how much their peers
have given. We find no evidence that peer donations provide a signal about the quality
of a charity (Vesterlund, 2003), or that peer effects are only related to fund-raising
targets (Andreoni, 1998). The explanation that is most consistent with observed
behaviour is that donors use information on (the distribution of) past donations as a
benchmark in deciding how much it is appropriate for them to give.
The plan of the remainder of the study is as follows. The next Section provides
information on our data – a subset of fund-raising pages set-up by runners in the 2010
London marathon. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy. Section 3 explores the
effect of other donations and the nature of the peer effects by looking at the effect of
large and small donations and changes in the mode, whereas Section 4 contains our
main econometric analysis. Section 5 explores alternative explanations of why donors
might respond to their peers and Section 6 concludes.
1. The Setting – Online Fund-raising
In this study, we focus on fund-raising pages set-up by people who raised money for
charity by running in the 2010 Londonmarathon and who fund raised via the two largest
fund-raising websites in the UK – Justgiving (www.justgiving.co.uk) and Virgin Money
Giving (http://uk.virginmoneygiving.com/giving/). The London marathon claims to
be the biggest single fund-raising event in the world and, of the approximately 35,000
runners who line up each year, an estimated 20,000 are raising money for charity.
Our initial sample contained information from more than 12,000 fund-raising pages.
The data were captured on 30 April 2010, five days after the marathon took place. For
each page we have all the information that is publicly available (examples of fund-
raising pages are shown in online Appendix B). This includes the fund-raiser’s name,
the charity they were fund-raising for, their target amount (if they had one), the total
amount raised offline at the time the data were captured, the full history of donations
to the website, the donors’ names (where available) and the amount given.
Table 1 provides a basic sample summary. Each fund-raiser gets an average of 34.5
donations and raises an average of £1,093 in online donations and £335 in reported
offline donations.6 Donations are spread over time. The typical page is set-up just over
two months before the marathon. Some fund-raisers create pages up to six months
before the event. Over this period, fund-raisers may sequentially target different sets of
people within their wider peer group. In this case, any observed change in donation
amounts (e.g. following a large or small donation or a change in the mode) may simply
reflect the arrival of a new donor group.When we look at amounts donated in Section 4,
we test for changes in arrival rates; we also carry out an additional robustness check
focusing only on donations made within the same day.
6 These totals exclude the value of UK Gift Aid tax relief, which is additionally passed to the charity by the
tax authorities.
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The mean online donation is £30.31. The distribution of donations is heavily
concentrated with spikes at £10 and £20 (and to a lesser extent other rounded
amounts) with just over half of all donations at exactly £10 or £20.
The distributions of donation amounts and the number of donations per page are
skewed by the presence of a few very successful fund-raisers7 and generous donors. In
our analysis, we exclude pages which have single donations of more than £1,000. We
also exclude pages with fewer than 10 donations (1,783 pages) or more than 100
donations (212 pages). With these exclusions, our sample is 10,597 pages.
2. Empirical Strategy
A commonly estimated model in the peer effects literature is a linear-in-means model.
In our case, this can be written as:
Table 1
Sample Summary Statistics
Mean SD Minimum
1st
percentile Median
99th
percentile Maximum
Full sample
Number of donations per
page
34.5 25.4 1 1 29 114 370
Number of days 74.8 50.7 0 0 67 204 225
Online donations – all £30.31 £66.02 £1 £5 £20 £200 £10,000
Total raised online per
page
£1,093 £1,401 £1 £20 £778 £5,710 £40,326
Total raised offline per
page
£335 £1,115 £0 £0 £0 £3,077 £53,000
Proportion of pages with
target
0.803
Proportion of pages with
target achieved
0.395
Target amounts £99,985 £9.9 m £0.01 £200 £1,500 £9,000 £1 bn
Number of fund-raisers 12,750
Estimation sample
Number of donations per
page
36.7 19.7 10 10 33 91 100
Number of days 79.5 49.5 2 6 73 205 225
Online donations £29.81 £46.58 £1 £5 £20 £200 £1,000
Total raised online per
page
£1,115 £916 £53 £136 £892 £4,458 £12,260
Total raised offline per
page
£310 £827 £0 £0 £0 £2,725 £43,897
Proportion of pages with
target
0.823
Proportion of pages with
target achieved
0.420
Target amounts £1,511 £832 £200 £200 £1,500 £5,000 £7,000
Number of fund-raisers 10,597
7 The biggest individual fund-raisers include Richard Branson who raised more than £35,000 for Virgin
Unite, including a single donation of £6,550, and popstar Natalie Imbruglia, also running for Virgin Unite
who raised more than £32,000, including a single donation of £10,000.
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din ¼ aþ c di;n1 þ uin ;
where the donation amount, d, given by donor n to page i is estimated as a function of
the mean of all past donations to the same page up to that point di;n1.
There are well-known problems in identifying peer effects (Brock and Durlauf, 2001;
Manski, 2003). In our case we can rule out the reflection problem as the amount given
by the nth donor will not affect the donations made by previous donors. Correlated
effects are a clear concern. Donors to a page will share socio-economic and
demographic characteristics because they are likely to be drawn from a fund-raiser’s
network of friends, family and work colleagues. They will also be subject to the
common influence of the same fund-raiser who may be more or less effective at
encouraging people to give.
Our identification strategy therefore relies on within-page variation in observed past
donations arising as a result of donors arriving at a page at different times to make
their donation. Of course there is likely to be some endogenous sorting within a page:
close family and friends will be among the first to give, as well as people with a strong
connection to the cause – and both these groups are likely to give more. This is clear
from the observed decline in mean donation size over the first few donations to a page
(see Figure 1a). In our analysis, we run regressions excluding the first three donations
to a page – this is both to allow for some donation history for subsequent donors to
respond to and also because the first three donations are systematically higher than the
rest and may possibly behave differently to those that follow (e.g. because they are from
the donor’s closest friends/family). Our main findings are not sensitive to this sample
selection. It is clear from a randomly selected sub-sample of pages (Figure 1b) that
there is also non-systematic variation in the size of donations within a page that causes
the within-page mean to vary. We exploit this variation to identify peer effects.
As a number of studies have pointed out (see discussion in Sacerdote, 2011), a
limitation of the linear-in-means model is that it may over-simplify – and potentially
obscure – the many different ways in which peer effects work in practice. Following
Sacerdote (2011), who presents a typology of potential peer effects in relation to
education, we can distinguish a number of different ways in which peer effects might
affect giving.
First, donations may be affected by ‘shining knights’, i.e. by large donations to a
page. A large donation is likely to place upwards pressure on amounts given among
donors who want to signal their wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) or generosity
(Harbaugh, 1998) or the closeness of their relationship with the fund-raiser by being
among the biggest donors. This would be likely only to affect the upper end of the
distribution among donors competing to give the most. Large donations may, however,
have a wider effect on all donors to the extent that they crowd out other giving,
assuming standard public good giving (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984) or crowd it in if
there is a threshold for the provision of the public good (Andreoni, 1998). Large
donations may also provide a signal about the quality of the charity (Vesterlund, 2003)
or affect individuals’ beliefs about how much it is appropriate to give, assuming such
beliefs are based on the observed distribution of amounts given.
Second, donations may be affected by ‘widows’ mites’, i.e. by small donations to a
page. Becker (1974) emphasised that donations might be motivated by the desire to
© 2013 The Author(s).
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avoid social stigma as well as to gain social prestige. Some donors will want to get away
with giving as little as possible and a small donation will allow them to reduce how
much they give. This is likely to affect donations at the lower end of the distribution.
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Fig. 1. (a) Mean Amount by Order of Donation on Page (full sample). (b) Within-page
Variation in Past Mean (randomly selected sub-sample)
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More generally, a small donation may also affect all others in ways similar to a large
donation – i.e. through crowd out/crowd in, signalling effects or benchmarking.
Third, there may be ‘herd behaviour’. Donors with a desire to conform may try to
target how much they give on the modal amount (Bernheim, 1994). In this case, the
amount given may be affected by (changes in) the mode of donations to a page. As
with small and large donations, a change in the mode may affect only some donors or
all other donors to a page.
Table 2 summarises the different ways in which donations by peers might influence
giving. The online fund-raising data allow us to explore these different types of peer
effects. In particular, we can look directly at the effect of ‘shining knights’ and ‘widows’
mites’ and of changes in the mode on amounts given. We also look at whether large
and small donations affect only some donors (in the upper/lower end of the
distribution) and/or whether the effects appear to be more general.
3. Estimates of Peer Effects – A Natural Experiment Approach
To look at the effects of ‘large’ and ‘small’ donations and changes in the modal
amount we estimate the following specification:
din ¼ aþ bTin þ z0indþ uin ;
where din refers to the nth donation to fund-raising page i (in pounds) and Tin is a
‘treatment’ indicator equal to 1 if the donation follows a large/small donation or a
change in the mode, or equal to 0 otherwise. We define a ‘large’ donation as being
at least twice the page mean (and more than £50). The mean ‘large’ donation is £102.
A ‘small’ donation is defined as half the page mean. The mean ‘small’ donation is
£8.61. We look separately at increases and decreases in the mode.8 zin is a vector of
controls for the systematic component of the timing of donations – the order on the
page and the date of donation respectively. The error term is decomposed into a
Table 2
Nature of Peer Effects in Giving
Donation will have an effect on 
Type of donation … only some donors if there is: … all donors if there is:
Large donations
(‘Shining knights’)
Competition to be the
top donor
Crowding in/out
Signalling quality
Benchmark for appropriate amount
Small donations
(‘Widows’ mites’)
Desire to avoid being the
bottom donor
Crowding in/out
Signalling quality
Benchmark for appropriate amount
Modal donations
(‘The herd’)
Following the herd; giving
what other people give
Crowding in/out
Signalling quality
Benchmark for appropriate amount
8 Where there is more than one mode, we look at increases in the maximum of the modes and decreases
in the minimum of the modes.
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constant page-specific effect that will pick up common differences in donations across
pages and a pure random error term: uin = gi + vin. We estimate this model using a
fixed-effects regression that removes the effect on donations of the page-specific
unobservable factors. We drop pages where a large or small donation occurs within the
first three donations; we also restrict the first change in the mode to occur after the
first three donations.
Our identifying assumption is that there is random variation in the timing of
donations, after controlling for systematic within-page variation, such that the random
error term, vin, is uncorrelated with the ‘treatment’ variable, Tin. We would argue that
this assumption is plausible, at least within a narrow window of donations, given that
the exact timing of when people make an online donation will be subject to a number
of exogenous factors. Exactly when donors arrive at the page – and hence whether they
arrive just before or just after a large/small donation – will be influenced by a number
of random factors such as when they turn on their computer and when they find a
moment to log on to the fund-raising website to make an online donation. Under our
identifying assumption, the coefficient b will identify the average causal effect of a
large/small donation on the amount subsequently given.
There are two possible violations of this identifying assumption. One is if large/small
donations affect the extensive margin – i.e. the probability that donors make a
donation. In this case, the observed donations before and after would be subject to a
differential selection process. A second is if fund-raisers sequentially target different
groups of donors – in which case the first large/small donation would herald the
arrival of a new group of donors. We have no information on visits to the websites, or
on donor characteristics that allow us to test for these effects directly. However, we can
look at the arrival rate of donations (i.e. the number of donations made to a page per
day) to give some indication of whether either of these is likely to be material. Both a
change in the extensive margin and the arrival of a new group of donors would be
associated with a change in the arrival rate.
Figure 2 plots the distributions of the arrival rates (i.e. the number of donations per
day) on the days before and after each of the four treatments we look at. There is little
obvious change in the distributions and this is confirmed by Kolgomorov–Smirnov
tests. The p-values for the equality of distributions before/after large and small
donations are 0.219 and 0.352, respectively, whereas the p-values for the equality of
distributions before/after increases and decreases in the mode are, respectively, 0.094
and 0.668. In all four cases we fail to reject that the distributions of arrival rates are the
same.
By contrast, Figure 3 provides clear evidence of effects on amounts given after each
of the four ‘treatments’. Donations increase after both a large donation and an
increase in the mode, whereas donations fall after both a small donation and a
decrease in the mode. These findings are confirmed by regression results, summarised
in Table 3. We vary the size of the window before and after – looking at a very narrow
window of one donation before/after and also five donations before/after and five
before and ten after. We do a further robustness check where we restrict the before
and after donations to lie within the same day, making it less likely that they have been
made by different groups of (sequentially targeted) donors.
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The results in panels (a)–(d) confirm that there is a change in how much subsequent
donors give following each of the four treatments. The coefficients indicate fairly
sizeable effects. Within a narrow window of one donation either side, large donations
are associated with a £12.49 increase in donation size, compared to a previous donation
level around £20, whereas a small donation reduces donation size by a similar
magnitude. The effects also appear to be fairly persistent affecting at least 10 donations
that follow; this is likely to work not just through the first large/small donation or
change in mode but also through changes in subsequent donations.
As discussed in the previous Section, large and small donations may affect amounts
given either by triggering competition among some donors (other large/small
donations) or, more generally, by influencing all other donors through crowd out/in,
signalling or benchmarking effects. We shed light on this by looking at the effect on
subsequent amounts given, excluding other large and small donations. This will tell us
whether the effect is (just) to trigger other large/small donations or whether it goes
wider than this. The results, shown in panels (e) and ( f ), indicate that large and small
donations do indeed trigger other similar-sized donations (the coefficients are smaller
than in panels (a) and (b)) but that there are effects even on ‘regular-sized’ donations.
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Fig. 2. Distributions of Arrivals. Before/After: (a) A ‘Large’ Donation; (b) A ‘Small’ Donation; (c) An
Increase in Mode; and (d) A Decrease in Mode
Notes. A large donation is defined as twice the page mean and at least £50. A small donation is
half the page mean. We focus on the first large/small donation or change in mode to occur on a
page, excluding those within the first three donations. p-value is for test of equality of
distributions (Kolgomorov–Smirnov).
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The coefficients in panels (a)–(d) indicate that the peer effects are increasing in
amount size – a large donation is associated with a bigger effect than an increase in the
mode. We explore this further by looking at the effects of different-sized large
donations (twice previous mean, three times previous mean, five times previous mean
and more than ten times previous mean). As in previous studies (Shang and Croson,
2009) we find that larger donations produce a greater response from subsequent
donors, at least up to very large donations of ten or more times the page mean.
Combined with our results on the effects of large/small donations and changes in the
mode, this supports our use of a linear-in-means model in the next Section.
Finally, we look at whether there is evidence of spillover effects from donors giving
more in response to a large donation on one fund-raising page to how much they
give on other fund-raising pages. We do this by exploiting the fact that, within
the Justgiving sample, we can identify donors who give to more than one fund-raising
page. We construct a donor-level panel of amounts given sequentially across different
pages.9
We estimate an equation of the following form:
dsj ¼ aþ b1Tsj þ b2Tðs1Þj þ gj þ xsj ;
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half the page mean. We focus on the first large/small donation or change in mode to occur on a
page, excluding those within the first three donations.
9 We drop 4% of donations which were made on the same day as we cannot identify donation order.
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where dsj refers to the sth donation of donor j. Tsj is an indicator equal to 1 if there has
been a large donation (within ten donations) to the page currently visited, whereas
T(s1)j is an indicator equal to 1 if the previous page visited by the donor had a large
donation. b1 captures the own-page effect and b2 any spillover effect of a large
donation on a previously visited page. We estimate this equation on the full sample of
( Justgiving) donors but the own-page and spillover effects are identified from donors
who give to multiple pages. We include a trend to allow for the fact that donors may
reduce their donations as they are asked to sponsor more people.
Table 3
Effect of Large/Small Donation and Change In Mode
One before/
one after
One before/one
after (same day)
Five before/
five after
Five before/
ten after
(a) Effect of a ‘large’ donation
After 12.458** 13.392** 12.611** 12.134**
(0.789) (2.609) (0.661) (0.496)
N 15,508 6,464 68,926 102,492
(b) Effect of a ‘small’ donation
After 11.411** 9.493** 11.169** 10.232**
(0.911) (2.090) (0.770) (0.550)
N 14,499 6,600 58,858 91,422
(c) Effect of an increase in the mode
After 0.424 1.755 0.887 1.137*
(1.211) (2.818) (0.961) (0.671)
N 11,394 7,137 55,272 80,104
(d) Effect of a decrease in the mode
After 3.250* 2.195 2.732** 4.142**
(1.290) (3.772) (0.959) (0.666)
N 12,665 8,754 55,114 87,904
(e) Effect of a large donation – excluding other large donations
After 2.541** 2.724** 3.051** 2.793**
(0.348) (1.001) (0.278) (0.208)
N 14,690 6,079 6,5386 9,6125
(f ) Effect of a small donation – excluding other small donations
After 2.050* 1.214 0.610 1.014*
(1.124) (2.751) (0.830) (0.606)
N 12,399 5,546 4,8705 7,2011
Twice
mean
Three times
mean
Five times
mean
Ten times
mean
(g) Effect of different-sized large donations (five donations before/five after)
After 11.154** 10.663** 17.396** 20.327**
(1.043) (0.973) (1.825) (3.155)
N 27,647 24,585 12,285 4,409
Notes. Dependent variable = £ amount given. A large donation is twice the page mean and at least £50. A
small donation is half the page mean. All regressions include fund-raising page fixed effects. Columns (III)
and (IV) in panels (a)–( f ) and all columns in panel (g) include additional controls for place within page
(linear trend), indicators for days since page was set-up (capped at 100) and indicator variables for two days
and one day before the marathon, the day of the marathon and (any) days after the marathon. *p < 0.10;
**p < 0.05.
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Our results confirm the own-page crowd-in effect. Our estimate is 5.91 (SE 3.11)
which is significant at the 10% level. The estimated spillover effect is also positive
(5.60), but insignificant (SE 1.80), suggesting that there is no crowd out of a large
donation to one page on donations to other fund-raising pages.
4. Econometric Analysis
In this Section we present estimates from a linear-in-means model. The attraction of
the mean is that it provides a simple summary statistic of the distribution of
donations that donors appear to be responding to. We have shown in the previous
Section that donors respond to large and small donations and to the mode. The
linear-in-means model provides a parsimonious specification to capture these
behaviours, particularly when we come to test for heterogeneity of effects in the
next Section.
We estimate the following specification:
din ¼ aþ c di;n1 þ z0indþ uin;
where din refers to the nth donation to fund-raising page i and di;n1 is the mean of all
donations made online to the fund-raising page up to the point at which the nth donor
arrives at the page.10 As before, zin is a set of indicators for the order in which the
donation occurs on the page and date controls, including indicators for the days since
the page was set-up (capped at 100) and also for the days in the immediate run up to
the day of the marathon.
We are interested in the coefficient c which measures the extent to which a higher
level of past donations across the page is associated with people giving more or less. The
OLS estimate of c is likely to be biased upwards by unobservable factors that affect all
donations to a page that can be captured in a page-specific error term, i.e. uin = gi + vin
These factors will include both shared (unobserved) characteristics of the donors to a
page, such as their income, as well as (unobserved) characteristics of the fund-raiser,
such as their persuasive power or their personal connection to a particular cause.11
Because of the latter factor, we cannot identify the effect of past donations from within-
donor variation across pages but only from variation within pages over time.
Estimating a fixed-effects model using a within-groups specification, however, will
lead to a downwards-biased estimate of c because the mean-differenced error term,
uin  ð1=N  1Þ
PN
j¼2 uij , will be negatively correlated with the mean-differenced
lagged dependent variable, di;n1  ð1=N  1Þ
PN1
j¼1 dij . In the case of estimating the
effect of the past mean of all donations, this bias will not be negligible even though we
have a long panel (the average number of donations per page in our analysis is 37 and
we observe many pages with 50 or more donations), unlike the standard case of
‘Nickell bias’ (Nickell, 1981). We show this formally in online Appendix C.
10 The donor will also see the amount raised offline up to the point at which they arrive at the website,
whereas we only know the total amount raised offline at the time the data were captured. As a robustness
check, we run the regressions only on pages with no offline donations.
11 The fact that fund-raiser characteristics may influence all donations to a page means that exploiting
information on multiple donations by the same donor to different pages is unlikely to lead to an unbiased
estimate.
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Our preferred approach, therefore, is to estimate c using the Arellano and Bond
(1991) GMM estimator.12
First, the page-specific effect gi is eliminated by first differencing:
Ddin ¼ cD di;n1 þ Dz0indþ Dvin :
In this first-differenced model there is, however, an endogeneity problem due to the
correlation between di;n1and vi,n1. As shown in online Appendix C, the bias of the
OLS estimator in this first-differenced model does not decrease with N. In our main
specification we use the two-period lag and the three-period lag of the page mean as
instruments for the (change in) mean of past donations, with different reduced form
coefficients per donation order. The Arellano–Bond test for serial correlation does not
reject the null of no second-order serial correlation, implying that the two-period lag is
valid as an instrument. The Hansen test does not indicate that the instrument set is not
valid.
Our main results are presented in Table 4. For comparison, we show both
the upwards-biased OLS and the downwards-biased fixed-effects results for all
specifications. Our preferred GMM results lie between these two for all specifications.
We also present results for the effect of the last donation and the effect of the mean of
the past five and ten donations. As demonstrated in online Appendix C, the extent of
downwards bias to the fixed-effects estimator is greater when looking at the past mean
of all donations to a page than for the simple lagged dependent variable.
In our main specification, the GMM estimate of c is positive and significant, implying
positive peer effects. This finding is robust to a number of robustness checks,
presented in Appendix A. In our main specification we drop the first three
observations from each page – we also show results dropping no and five observations.
We also vary the instrument set, using different lags as instruments for the past mean.
The estimated coefficient indicates that a £10 increase in the mean of past
donations leads to people giving £2.50 more on average. To illustrate the magnitude of
this, the effect of a £150 donation following three donations of £20 would be to
increase giving by £8.13, whereas the effect of a £150 donation following six donations
of £20 would be to increase giving by £4.64 (in both cases, the effect on giving in the
case of the lagged dependent variable would be to increase giving by £2.86). This
highlights an important feature of estimating the effect of the past mean – that the
effect of a single donation diminishes, the later it occurs on a page. This is intuitively
plausible as a donor may give less weight to a single large donation if there are more
other donations on the page. We also find further empirical support for this finding by
repeating the analysis from the previous Section and looking at the effect of a single
‘large’ donation made after 10 donations and after 15 donations to a page (compared
with a large donation that occurs between five and ten donations). The estimated
effect of a large donation is reduced by £1.19 when it occurs after 10 or more donations
and by £2.50 when it occurs after 15 or more donations. This lends further support to
including the past mean of all donations as the preferred empirical specification and
we focus on this specification in the next Section.
12 We estimate the GMM model using xtabond2, see Roodman (2006).
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5. Inside the Black Box – Exploring Why Peers Matter
We would like to understand why peers matter. As discussed in Section 3, there are
several potential explanations. On the basis of our findings so far, we can rule out that
donors are (just) aiming to be the most generous donor to a page as both small
donations and changes in the mode matter; large donations also have a wider effect
than simply triggering similar-sized donations. By analogous reasoning, we can also
rule out that donors are (just) trying to avoid being the least generous donor to a page.
The observed effects of large and small donations also imply that donors do not just try
to follow the herd and match the mode.
Table 2 summarised a number of potential explanations of why large/small
donations and changes in the mode may affect all donations that follow. Our
estimates of peer effects are positive, ruling out classic crowd out. Andreoni (1998)
discusses the case in which threshold contribution levels, such as a minimum level of
funding required before the public good can be produced, can result in crowd in –
Table 4
Main Regression Results
(I) (II) (III)
OLS
Page fixed
effects
Difference
GMM
(a) Past_mean (£) 0.525** 0.359** 0.250**
(0.013) (0.023) (0.028)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1), p-value 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2), p-value 0.322
Hansen test, p-value
(217 over-ID restrictions)
0.864
(b) Mean, last ten (£) 0.458** 0.114** 0.202**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1), p-value 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2), p-value 0.313
Hansen test, p-value
(217 over-ID restrictions)
0.397
(c) Mean, last five (£) 0.361** 0.047** 0.116**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1), p-value 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2), p-value 0.348
Hansen test, p-value
(217 over-ID restrictions)
0.771
(d ) Past_donation (£) 0.125** 0.003 0.022**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1), p-value 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2), p-value 0.051
Hansen test, p-value
(217 over-ID restrictions)
0.630
Notes. Dependent variable: donation amount (£). Sample size: I = 10,597, NI = 364,286. Instruments are the
second and third-period lag of the (level) independent variable. All regressions include additional controls
for place within page (linear trend), indicators for days since page was set-up (capped at 100) and indicator
variables for two days and one day before the marathon, the day of the marathon and (any) days after the
marathon. **p < 0.01.
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essentially large donations make it more likely that the threshold will be reached,
which can encourage other donations. The potential effects of thresholds are relevant
to the London marathon fund-raising pages, the majority of which have fund-raising
targets. We find that peer effects are stronger for pages with a target but we also find a
positive and significant effect for pages without a target (Table 5, column (I)). This
indicates that targets do not provide the full explanation of the observed peer effects.
There are further interesting differences in behaviour around the target. Regression
analysis, summarised in Table 6, columns (I) and (II) shows, first, that the size of the
first donation to take the total over the target donation is significantly higher and
second that donations are lower on average after the target than before. Assuming as
before that there is some random variation in exactly when donors arrive at a page
(and that they are equally likely to arrive before or after the target, within a narrow
window), this could be interpreted as a negative effect of hitting the target on
donations. One important caveat to this is that it is possible for fund-raisers to change
their target (e.g. to increase the target amount once it has been reached). We have no
evidence on the extent to which this happens in practice.
Finally, column (III) of Table 6 provides the results from a further GMM regression
in which the past mean of donations is interacted with an indicator for the donor
arriving after the target has been reached. This tests whether the crowd-in effect of past
donations is the same on either side of the target. We find that the coefficient on the
interaction term is negative and similar in magnitude to the coefficient on the past
Table 5
Testing for Heterogeneous Effects
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Past_mean (£) 0.104** 0.160** 0.098** 0.264** 0.214**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Past_mean 9 page with target 0.158**
(0.050)
Past_mean 9 medium charity 0.043
(0.057)
Past_mean 9 large charity 0.078
(0.056)
Past_mean 9 major charity 0.085
(0.054)
Past_mean 9 charity age > 10 years 0.127**
(0.047)
Past_mean 9 charity age > 20 years 0.018
(0.047)
Past_mean 9 overseas charity 0.079
(0.045)
Past_mean 9 young donors 0.020
(0.046)
Number of observation = NI 364,286 183,619 280,660 260,362 364,286
Number of pages = I 10,597 5,248 8,208 8,194 10,597
Notes. Difference GMM: Dependent variable = donation amount (£). All regressions include additional
controls for place within page (linear trend), indicators for days since page was set-up (capped at 100) and
indicator variables for two days and one day before the marathon, the day of the marathon and (any) days
after the marathon. Instruments are the two-period and three-period lag of the past mean. **p < 0.01.
Medium, large and major charities have incomes of £1 m–£5 m, £5 m–£50 m and £50 m+ respectively.
Young donors are defined by the fund-raiser being <40.
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mean implying that there is no crowd-in effect of past donations once the target has
been reached.
Another possibility is that donations may be important as a signal of the quality of the
charity, with higher (lower) donations indicating that the particular cause is more (less)
worthy of support (Vesterlund, 2003). To explore this empirically we adopt an idea,
proposed by Heutel (2013), that the information content of past donations should be
more important for smaller charities and for younger charities, for charities operating
overseas whose activities are less easy to observe directly and for younger donors. To
implement this we match data from the Charity Commission Register, comprising all
registered charities in England andWales. We are able to find amatch in the case of 78%
of fund-raising pages (some of those we cannot match are Scottish and Irish charities),
although information is not always available for all charities even where amatch is made.
Table 5 summarises the results from a set of regressions that include interaction
terms, allowing the effect of the past mean to vary by, respectively – the size of the
charity, the age of the charity, the location of charitable activity (UK or overseas) and
the age of the fund-raiser (which proxies for the age of donors, defined by a cut-off of
40). The results provide little support for this particular signalling story. The effect of
past donations is actually stronger for larger charities and for older charities, although
the differences are not statistically significant. We find no difference in peer effects
between overseas and UK-based charities. We find no evidence of statistically
significant differences by age.13
Table 6
Donations Around the Target Amount
(I) (II) (III)
Fixed
effects
Difference
GMM
Difference
GMM
Target donation 53.988** 47.506** 50.554**
(3.957) (3.455) (1.490)
Reached target 3.517** 2.563 3.588**
(0.564) (1.482) (1.398)
Past_mean (£) 0.262** 0.268**
(0.040) (0.030)
Past_mean 9 reached target 0.191**
(0.030)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1), p-value 0.000 0.000
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2), p-value 0.940 0.943
Hansen test, p-value
(over-ID restrictions)
0.669 0.898
(205) (395)
Number of observation = NI 139,201 135,308 135,308
Number of pages = I 3,893 3,893 3,839
Notes. Dependent variable = donation amount (£). All regressions include additional controls for place
within page (linear trend), indicators for days since page was set-up (capped at 100) and indicator variables
for two days and one day before the marathon, the day of the marathon and (any) days after the marathon.
Target donation is the first donation to take the total over the target amount. Reached target is an indicator
variable if the total is greater than the target. Instruments are the two-period and three-period lag of the past
mean. **p < 0.01.
13 We obtain information on the age of the fund-raiser by matching to the marathon results. Age of 18–40
is the youngest category given in this database. We obtain similar results if we use older cut-offs.
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Instead of signalling charity quality, past donations may alternatively signal to donors
how much it is socially appropriate for them to give. This is our preferred explanation
of why past donations affect the amount given. When they arrive at a page, donors
observe the distribution of past donations and use this to form – or update – their
beliefs about how much they should give. These beliefs are likely to be donor (and
possibly fund-raiser) specific; donors will have some idea of where they should locate
within the distribution depending on their characteristics relative to those of other
donors, including the proximity of their relationship with the fund-raiser, their
support for a particular charity and their income (and possibly what their peers know
about their income). Large/small donations and the mode will all affect amounts
donated subsequently because they will be used to inform donors’ beliefs. We cannot
test this benchmarking story explicitly but it is consistent with the observed pattern of
behaviour, including both donor responses to past donations and the fact that,
individually, past donations have less effect if they occur later on in the page.
6. Discussion
This study adds to the empirical literature on what Andreoni has referred to as ‘the
inherent sociality of giving’ by providing new evidence on the importance of peer
effects in charitable giving in the context of online individual fund-raising.
Online fund-raising is important to look at in its own right as a sizeable – and
growing – channel for raising money for charities in the UK and elsewhere. It also
provides an excellent setting to look at peer effects as it offers an environment in which
donors observe donations from people within their naturally occurring peer groups
(i.e. their friends, family and colleagues).
There is an inevitable issue about the extent to which our findings can be
generalised beyond this particular setting. The online fund-raising context in which
donors can see all other donations – and know that their donations will be seen – is
arguably quite distinctive. However, it is one that is potentially relevant to practitioners
and policy makers interested in whether they can exploit the power of peer effects by
providing similar levels of publicity to donations in other settings. Furthermore, by
looking at data that span more than 1,000 different charities, we have been able to
demonstrate that peer effects are not limited to particular charities or groups of
donors, suggesting that the effects are likely to be more broadly generalisable.
The richness of the data also allows us to explore potential explanations of why peers
matter. We can reject that donors systematically compete to be the top, or strive to
avoid being the bottom or align themselves with the mode or median. Our preferred
explanation, which is consistent with the empirical findings, is that donors give what
they think that they personally are expected to give where the distribution of the
donations of their peers (along with other factors, such as income and specific cause)
feed into the formation of that expectation.
In this study we have analysed only a small sub-sample of the population of online
fund-raising pages that are potentially available. Going forward, information from
online fund-raising pages, particularly matched with social network data, has the
potential to yield even further insights into how donors behave in social settings.
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